distortion is due to the externalities on agents' reservation utilities. In contrast, when the principal's offers are privately … observed, the distortion is due to the externalities arising at efficient trade profiles. When the principal can commit to an …

distortion is due to the externalities on agents' reservation utilities. In contrast, when the principal's offers are privately … observed, the distortion is due to the externalities arising at efficient trade profiles. When the principal can commit to an …

We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors …

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …