We analyze how boards' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely than manager-friendly boards to use hidden pay or to distort incentive contracts. Stronger...

This paper provides evidence on how executive compensation relates to firm performance in listed firms in China. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on executive compensation and ownership structure, we find for...

This essay analyses the relationship between corporate governance practices and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) wages from a sample of Portuguese listed companies over the period from 2002-2011. The relationship between CEO total compensation and shareholders return, firm characteristics, CEO...

We study the dynamics of managerial influence and Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs) compensation over the course of financial distress during 1992 to 2012. Using a matching estimator to identify suitable controls, we find that under distress firms reduce managerial board appointments, intensify...

In this paper, I examine determinants and trends in top executive compensation in Israeli publicly traded firms between the years 1995–2018. I find a large increase in executive compensation in the earlier period of the sample culminating in 2007, especially in financial firms. Between 2008...

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on top managers’ compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms’ use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque’s (2009) method are similar to those...

Purpose: As elsewhere in the world, family firms (FFs) play a critical role in the South African economy. There is, however, scant research on how, if at all, listed South African FFs differ from their non-family counterparts concerning board composition and independence. The purpose of this...