Although strong empirical evidence suggests that the entrepreneurs in countries with weak legal systems often engage in "tunneling" (expropriating funds that rightfully belong to minority shareholders), the same entrepreneurs may prop up firms using their private resources. Anecdotal evidence...

This paper studies the payout policy of Italian firms controlled by large majority shareholders (controlled firms). The paper reports that a firm's share of dividends in total payout (dividends plus repurchases) is negatively related to the size of the cash flow stake of the firm's controlling...

In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model...

We study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. We exploit as an exogenous event the State Capital Operation Program in China under which parent central state-owned enterprises (parent CSOEs) are required to partially contribute their income to a fiscal fund. We...