In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the UK created the first stewardship code which was designed to transform its rationally passive institutional investors into actively engaged shareholders. In the UK corporate governance context, this idea made sense. Institutional investors...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

This chapter from the forthcoming Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, eds.) examines the role of shareholders in the modern American public corporation. The chapter starts with the Berle and Means (1932) problem of the separation of ownership and...

Although empirical studies show that common shareholding affects corporate conduct and that common horizontal shareholding lessens competition, critics have argued that the law should not take any action until we have clearer proof on the causal mechanisms. I show that we actually have ample...

This conceptual paper investigates the reasons behind the recent increase in corporate engagement by institutional shareholders. Whilst the rise of institutional ownership is nothing new, what has changed is that large economies of scale in the fund management industry have resulted in ownership...

Since the UK adopted the world’s first stewardship code in 2010, stewardship codes have proliferated across Asia. Given the UK Code’s prominence, it is tempting to assume that every other stewardship code preforms the same function as the UK Code. This assumption belies the truth: all these...

This article examines the phenomenon of shareholder activism using a case study methodology as a qualitative research approach. Three affected Swiss public companies have been selected on the basis of an evaluation of all corresponding reports published by Finanz und Wirtschaft (FuW). The study...

We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may...

Corporations play a crucial role in achieving a sustainable world. In achieving corporate sustainability, the current regulatory frameworks generally emphasize the role of the corporate board, but today's media suggest that institutional investors are becoming more involved. In this study, we...

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...