Croatian capital market is, from the beginning of the year 2009, governed by new Capital Market Act that introduces higher level of investor protection, by posing firmer rules on mandatory disclosure for listed companies. Based on the similar trends in comparative law it could be expected that...

Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People's Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly...

We survey law firms, firms and institutional investors to better understand their preferred method of intra-corporate dispute resolution in Brazil. Consistent with a number of theories, we find that these organizations prefer arbitration to judicial claims as the method of intra-corporate...

Shareholder litigation has been a prominent topic in the comparative corporate governance literature for decades. However, scholars trained in a particular jurisdiction often tend to look for types of lawsuits familiar from their home turf. In particular, the English-language literature has...

When shareholders of a target firm expect a value improving takeover to be successful, they are individually better off not tendering their shares to the buyer and the takeover potentially fails. Squeeze-out procedures can overcome this free-riding dilemma by allowing a buyer to enforce a payout...

This study examines how universal demand (UD) laws affect shareholder derivative litigation risk and financial reporting decisions. We provide evidence that the incremental risk from derivative litigation beyond parallel securities class actions or SEC actions appears low in financial reporting...

The option to file a lawsuit against an entrepreneur encourages shareholders to fund projects and to retain entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur, at risk of a lawsuit filing, may save cash as a precautionary measure. When cash accumulates and a lawsuit filing does not occur, an entrepreneur increases...

Shareholder litigation risk varies across time and across firms. When shareholder litigation risk is high, it can increase (decrease) a firm's cash and investment before (after) a lawsuit filing. When shareholder litigation risk is low, little to no impact occurs. A quasi-natural experiment...

Using a large set of restatement announcements and regulatory filings by U.S.-listed firms between 2003 and 2009, we find evidence that managers aim to reduce litigation risk by (1) bundling negative information, such as earnings restatements, with other public announcements, and (2) leaking...