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We analyze a dynamic model of informed trading where a shareholder accumulates shares in an anonymous market and then expends costly effort to change the firm value. We find that equilibrium prices are affected by the position accumulated by the shareholder, because the level of effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010258547
We analyze a model of informed trading where an activist shareholder accumulates shares in an anonymous market and then expends costly effort to increase the firm value. We find that equilibrium prices are affected by the position accumulated by the activist, because the level of effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073196
We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Variation in parameters can produce either positive or negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978089
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We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Variation in parameters can produce either positive or negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900048
We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Variation in parameters can produce either positive or negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455787
We analyze a model of informed trading where an activist shareholder accumulates shares in an anonymous market and then expends costly effort to increase the firm value. We find that equilibrium prices are affected by the position accumulated by the activist, because the level of effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459042