We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any...

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Scarf's algorithm [18] provides fractional core elements for NTU-games. Biró and Fleiner [3] showed that Scarf's algorithm can be extended for capacitated NTU-games. In this setting agents can be involved in more than one coalition at a time, cooperations may be performed with different...

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and (ii) men and women. In the case of the latter, it produces either one or two stable matches whereby no man and woman would prefer to be matched with each other rather than with...

The main result of this paper is the convexity of Step out - Step in (SoSi) sequencing games, a class of relaxed sequencing games first analyzed by Musegaas, Borm, and Quant (2015). The proof makes use of a polynomial time algorithm determining the value and an optimal processing order for an...