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Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments

Groh, Christian; Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Sunde, Uwe - In: Economic Theory 49 (2012) 1, pp. 59-80

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539224

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2010

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529178

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366

Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning

Sela, Aner - In: Review of economic design : RED 21 (2017) 4, pp. 253-272

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899921

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and economic behavior 88 (2014), pp. 130-134

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289482

Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Segev, Ella; Sela, Aner - In: European economic review : EER 70 (2014), pp. 371-382

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498838

Contests with insurance

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Review of economic design : RED 24 (2020) 1/2, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607108

The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players

Krumer, Alex; Megidish, Reut; Sela, Aner - In: Journal of scheduling : JOS 23 (2020) 3, pp. 379-396

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012229011

Carrots and sticks : collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014634136

CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS

Sela, Aner; Megidish, Reut - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2010

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727312