We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

The received characterizations of feasible interim allocations are mostly in the spirit of Border (1991): Fix a family of sets, each containing some player-types, and test the interim allocation under consideration against all these sets. In the published literature, such Border-like...

In this paper I discuss issues surrounding the allocation of elective courses amongst second year students at Indian Institutes of Management in India. This is a very interesting market design problem which can use results from Auction Theory to help align more students with their desired...

The paper analyzes the seller's expected revenue in auctions with a large number of asymmetric players. We explicitly calculate the revenue in large asymmetric first-price, second-price, and optimal auctions to O(1/n^3) accuracy, where n is the number of players. These calculations show that the...

We use the experimental method to study the costs and benefits of allowing joint bidding in simultaneous multi-unit first price sealed bid auctions for bundled goods. The research has immediate applications to the sale of public forest stands that arbor a mixture of species. Joint bidding and...

Auctions as a mechanism for allocating advertising positions for specific keywords entered by search engine users are used routinely by numerous firms. Considerable research has been conducted to ascertain auction formats that generate the greatest expected seller’s revenue and are also...