We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

The paper analyzes the seller's expected revenue in auctions with a large number of asymmetric players. We explicitly calculate the revenue in large asymmetric first-price, second-price, and optimal auctions to O(1/n^3) accuracy, where n is the number of players. These calculations show that the...

We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

When selling goods like wireless spectrum or electricity contracts, auction designers often opt for core-selecting mechanisms -- i.e., auctions that induce outcomes in the core -- in order to balance revenue and efficiency goals. But increasingly, auctions -- such as the FCC's 2016-17 Incentive...

During the recent past, passenger air transport has been recovering from its significant retraction during the Covid-19 pandemic. If the recent significant drop in air traffic due to the pandemic acted as an external mitigating factor to airport traffic congestion in several major airports...

We consider mechanisms for allocating a common-value prize between two players in an incomplete information setting. In this setting, each player receives an independent private signal about the prize value. The signals are from a discrete distribution and the value is increasing in both...