Showing 1 - 10 of 191
We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317289
We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704962
We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183375
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212939
In the random assignment problem, there is a set of agents and a set of the same number of indivisible objects. Each agent has a preference ordering over the objects. We seek a method of assigning one object to each agent, using some randomisation to achieve fairness. The central solutions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014078118
We study the allocation problem of an indivisible object to one of several agents on the full preference domain when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our main requirement is strategy-proofness. The other properties we seek are Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness. We provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970732
When allocating indivisible objects, agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956467
We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is generally not compatible with efficiency in this problem. We characterize the priority structures for which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032068
We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit assignment problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913506
We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243117