Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance...

This paper deals with cost allocation problems arising from connection situations where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers. To solve such problems, we extend classical solutions from the theory of minimum cost spanning tree games. We study the properties of such solutions and...

The analysis of single-valued solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utilities has a long tradition. Opposed to most of this literature we will not deal with solution concepts that provide payoffs to the players for the grand coalition only, but we will analyze allocation...

Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at Business Schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms to infer student preferences and to determine who have bigger claims on course seats. We show that these two roles may...

This paper focuses on new characterizations of convex multi-choice games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. Further- more, (level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes (limas) on the class of convex multi-choice games are introduced and studied. It turns out that each element...

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for...

In a cooperative game, there may be a series of coalitions which may lead to the coalition equilibrium of the game. There is a mixed coalition equilibrium under the principle of maximum allocation in a cooperative game. If the allocation process of the coalitions can satisfy the competitive...

Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex...

Economic agents often care about their relative well-being: they compare with their neighbors in a social network. In this case, which network structures permit stable allocations? We construct a model in which agents' payoffs depend on the ranking of their allocations among the payoffs of their...