This paper explores the possibility of privately inefficient job separations due to bargaining friction and its implications for the unemployment dynamics. I propose a simple specification of bargaining friction by including bargaining wedges in the standard Nash bargaining model. Such...

We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's expected payoff is decreasing...

Gale and Sabourian (2006) discuss the existence of inefficient Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) in a heterogeneous market. This paper shows that the example they provide cannot be supportedas a MPE. Indeed, with two buyers and two sellers, the dispersion of bargaining positions is not...

We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long-term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the...

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision. -- Fair Division ; Maxmin Allocation ; Kalai...

Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary...

Seit Jahren hat das dezentrale System der Hochschulzulassung in Deutschland aufgrund von Mehrfachzulassungen bis lange nach Semesterbeginn mit dem Problem unbesetzter Studienplätze zu kämpfen eines der typischen Probleme dezentraler Zuordnungsverfahren. Langwierige Nachrückverfahren...

This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...

Nicht alle Güter werden über einen Preismechanismus auf Märkten gehandelt. Angebot und Nachfrage von Plätzen an Schulen und Universitäten, die Zuweisung von Organen bei Lebendspendern und die Partnerwahl vollziehen sich nach anderen Regeln. Wie diese Regeln gestaltet sein müssen, um zu...

We present a model in which mutual gains from trade motivate the use of termination provisions in merger contracts. The inclusion of a termination provision in the contract permits Pareto efficient merger contracts and results in strictly higher payoffs for both bidder and target compared to...