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Core is manipulable via segmentation

Sertel, Murat R.; Yildiz, Muhamet - In: Journal of economic theory 118 (2004) 1, pp. 103-117

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002348778

Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments

Sertel, Murat R. - In: Economics letters 46 (1994) 2, pp. 167-171

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001171351

Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games

Sertel, Murat R.; Sanver, M. Remzi - In: European journal of political economy 15 (1999) 2, pp. 149-162

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001381837

Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

Sertel, Murat R.; Özkal-Sanver, İpek - In: Mathematical social sciences 44 (2002) 1, pp. 65-83

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001694105

Walrasian bargaining

Yildiz, Muhamet (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001644152

Walrasian bargaining

Yildiz, Muhamet - In: Games and economic behavior 45 (2003) 2, pp. 465-487

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001826995

Walrasian Bargaining

Yildiz, Muhamet - 2003

Given any two-person economy, we consider a simple alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the agents offer prices. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all stationary subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014121254