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Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy

Kuhn, Michael (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002050615

The revelation and delegation principles in common agency games

Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400675

Decomposable Principal-Agent Problems

Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2004

This paper investigates conditions under which the adverse selection principal-agent problem can be decomposed into a collection of pointwise maximization problems. The analysis uses an extension of the type assignment approach to optimal nonuniform pricing, pioneered by Goldman, Leland and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069601

Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Moriya, Fumitoshi; Yamashita, Takuro - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489815

Delegating Resource Allocation : Multidimensional Information vs. Decisions

Galperti, Simone - 2015

This paper studies the problem of delegating the allocation of resources across multiple categories to an agent who has … cap on the allocation to each category, a generalization of Holmström's (1977) ‘interval controls' to multidimensional … allocation. Such limits are more likely to be optimal when the conflict is weaker and the agent's information is also on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028127

Capital reallocation and adverse selection

Li, Shaojin; Whited, Toni Marion - 2014

We investigate how adverse selection in the used capital market generates procyclical sales of used capital -- capital reallocation. In our model, adverse selection produces a resale discount for used capital. In equilibrium, this endogenous partial irreversibility is more severe in recessions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483664

Strategic Manipulation Induced by Moral Hazard : The 'Aim for Rejection' Problem in Japanese Daycare Allocations

Yokote, Koji - 2019

This paper focuses on a particular type of strategic manipulation observed in Japanese daycare allocations. Some parents intentionally apply to a highly demanded daycare and are rejected, because a certificate indicating that they were rejected is required to extend the parental leave period....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894532

Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources

Osano, Hiroshi - 2012

This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117049

Information aggregation and adverse selection

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011 - This Version: 07 December 2010, First Version: 24 July 2007

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345986

Dynamic Capital Allocation and Managerial Compensation

Fu, Shiming - 2017

This paper proposes a dynamic theory of capital budgeting and compensation when investment information is decentralized and division manager can inefficiently deploy capital. The incentive cost and firm policies vary monotonically with stored liquidity. After bad performances, liquidity is low,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968972