Showing 1 - 10 of 8,998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002050615
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle – what we term the“delegation principle” – can be used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400675
This paper investigates conditions under which the adverse selection principal-agent problem can be decomposed into a collection of pointwise maximization problems. The analysis uses an extension of the type assignment approach to optimal nonuniform pricing, pioneered by Goldman, Leland and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069601
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489815
This paper studies the problem of delegating the allocation of resources across multiple categories to an agent who has … cap on the allocation to each category, a generalization of Holmström's (1977) ‘interval controls' to multidimensional … allocation. Such limits are more likely to be optimal when the conflict is weaker and the agent's information is also on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028127
We investigate how adverse selection in the used capital market generates procyclical sales of used capital -- capital reallocation. In our model, adverse selection produces a resale discount for used capital. In equilibrium, this endogenous partial irreversibility is more severe in recessions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483664
This paper focuses on a particular type of strategic manipulation observed in Japanese daycare allocations. Some parents intentionally apply to a highly demanded daycare and are rejected, because a certificate indicating that they were rejected is required to extend the parental leave period....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894532
This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117049
We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345986
This paper examines the role of rational attention allocation in shaping private information acquisition, and its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855532