We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...

We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the...

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al. (2017)) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is...

We show that weak concavity of the cost function leads to optimality of single prize in contests with maximal performance objective, which generalizes the previous result in Chawla et al. (2015). Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that, with the constant elasticity functional form, enough convexity...

We study a setting in which dynamically arriving items are assigned to waiting agents, who have heterogeneous values for distinct items and heterogeneous outside options. An ideal match would both target items to agents with the worst outside options, and match them to items for which they have...

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the...

In this paper we present the main results of three original studies on the equilibrium with a market of tradeable permits in a static framework. In first study, we have considered an international equilibrium of two countries which depend on the quantity of permits to each country. The...

In this paper we present the main results of three original studies on the equilibrium with a market of tradeable permits in a static framework. In first study, we have considered an international equilibrium of two countries which depend on the quantity of permits to each country. The...

Equilibria and optima generally differ in imperfectly competitive markets. While this is well understood theoretically, it is unclear how large the welfare distortions are in the aggregate economy. Do they matter quantitatively? To answer this question, we develop a multi-sector monopolistic...