Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a "newcomer" in the...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that TTC is the only rule that is strategyproof and individually-rational. We hence relax this constraint and consider pair-efficiency. A...

When allocating indivisible objects, agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a...

We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We introduce a new axiom called pre-exchange-proofness, which states that no pair of agents gain by exchanging their endowments with each other prior to the operation of the chosen rule. We establish that a...