We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...

We study mechanism design in dynamic nonmonetary markets where objects are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types and quasi-linear payoffs in their waiting costs. We consider a general class of mechanisms that determine the joint distribution of the object assigned to each agent and...

Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices, and sometimes for free. Such "non-market" mechanisms necessarily sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. In this paper, we develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents...

When allocating indivisible objects, agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a...

We study airport slot allocation problems during weather-induced congestion. These real-life matching problems are important to airlines as the costs of delays are significant compared to their profits. We introduce a new mechanism, Multiple Trading Cycles (MTC), to allocate landing slots. In...

We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices

I prove that there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. This strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening their assumption of ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an...

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al. (2017)) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is...

We consider a many-to-many matching problem with a priority structure such as the one in undergraduate course allocation. In order to incorporate course priorities, we develop a deterministic pseudo-market mechanism with priority-specific prices that is based on the approximate competitive...

In 56 developing and developed countries, blood component donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of the demand. In these countries, blood banks rely heavily on replacement donor programs that provide blood to patients in return for donations made by their close...