Increasingly, shareholders and regulators have been calling for a reigning in of executive salaries. Most of this discussion has focused on bonuses and stock options, the more observable portions of an executive compensation package. However long term incentive pay, such as supplemental...

We examine the effect of CEO turnover on earnings management in banks. Since banking is intrinsically an opaque activity, we hypothesize that an incoming CEO of a bank is more likely to manage earnings than a counterpart in a non financial firm. To identify the hypothesized effects, we exploit...

Based on 16,604 observations between 1994 and 2006, this study revisits the “horizon problem” by examining how CEO retirement affects conditional accounting conservatism. We hypothesize and find that firms become less conservative in their financial reporting before the retirement of their...

We examine the effects of CEO turnover in banks. Incoming bank CEOs face problems from information asymmetry because banks' operations are opaque and bank risk can change dramatically in a short time. Incoming bank CEOs may therefore change bank policies to manage their personal risks. Since CEO...

An advisor post is one of the most important CEO's post-retirement careers. Using unique hand-collected data on advisor posts in Japanese listed firms, we examine whether retiring CEOs overstate earnings to acquire an advisor post. Consistent with the horizon problem, we find that earnings...