When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest to insure themselves against future "risk-class" classification. Accordingly, the First-Best typically involves transfers across states of nature. Competitive equilibrium cannot provide such...

In a perfectly competitive market for annuities with full information, the price of annuities is equal to individuals (discounted) survival probabilities. That is, prices are actuarially fair. In contrast, the pricing implicit in social security systems invariably allows for cross subsidization...

The purpose of the present paper is to focus on the potential inducement to retire earlier in the presence of social security and on the implied effects on lifetime savings. This problem is analyzed within the framework of a model of intertemporal utility maximization. The organization of this...

In a perfectly competitive market for annuities with full information, the price of annuities is equal to individuals' (discounted) survival probabilities. That is, prices are actuarially fair. In contrast, the pricing implicit in social security systems invariably allows for cross subsidization...

When information on longevity (survival functions) is unknown early in life, individuals have an interest to insure themselves against future 'risk-class' classification. Accordingly, the First-Best typically involves transfers across states of nature. Competitive equilibrium cannot provide such...