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The effects of introducing mixed payment systems for physicians : experimental evidence

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; … - 2015

Mixed payment systems have become a prominent alternative to paying physicians through fee-for-service and capitation … understood when introducing mixed systems. We systematically analyze the influence of fee-for-service, capitation, and mixed …-for-service and significant underprovision under capitation, though less than predicted when assuming profit-maximization. Introducing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496146

Physicians' incentives to adopt personalized medicine : experimental evidence

Bardey, David; Nzalé, Samuel Kembou; Ventelou, Bruno - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013498989

Quality competition and hospital mergers : an experiment

Han, Johann; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Vomhof, Markus - 2016

Based on a Salop model with regulated prices, we investigate quality provision behavior of competing hospitals before and after a merger. For this, we use a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects decide on the level of treatment quality as head of a hospital. We find that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444718

The effects of introducing mixed payment systems for physicians : experimental evidence

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; … - In: Health economics 26 (2017) 2, pp. 243-262

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011815346

Quality provision in competitive health care markets : individuals vs. teams

Han, Johann; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Vomhof, Markus - 2020

We investigate the quality provision behavior and its implications for the occurrence of collusion in competitive health care markets where providers are assumed to be altruistic towards patients. For this, we employ a laboratory experiment with a health care market framing where subjects decide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160455

Anyone up for helping the fisherman's wife? : more solidarity with accidental misery than with man-made misery

Frank, Björn; Li, Sha; Meisenzahl, Stephan; Minich, Heike - 2009

We examine the willingness to donate depending on whether “misery” is random generated or self-inflicted by too high demands in bilateral negotiations. We find that randomness has a positive influence on the total amount of donation. In case of self-inflicted “misery” we observe that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852269

Unraveling fairness in simple games? : the role of empathy and theory of mind

Artinger, Florian; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Koppel, Hannes; … - 2010

Economists have been theorizing that other-regarding preferences influence decision making. Yet, what are the corresponding psychological mechanisms that inform these preferences in laboratory games? Empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM) are dispositions considered to be essential in social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980496

Group membership, competition, and altruistic versus antisocial punishment : evidence from randomly assigned army groups

Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan - 2010

We investigate how group boundaries, and the economic environment surrounding groups, affect altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to platoons. We find that, without competition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007802

The development of egalitarianism, altruism, spite and parochialism in childhood and adolescence

Fehr, Ernst; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias - 2011

We study how the distribution of other-regarding preferences develops with age. Based on a set of allocation choices, we can classify each of 717 subjects, aged 8 to 17 years, as either egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Varying the allocation recipient as either an in-group or an out-group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011378

Giving in dictator games : experimenter demand effect or preference over the rules of the game?

Chlaß, Nadine; Moffatt, Peter G. - 2012

Traditionally, giving in dictator games was assumed to signal preferences over others' payoffs. To date, several studies find that dictator game giving breaks down under conditions designed to increase dictators' anonymity or if an option to take money obscures the purpose of the task. Giving is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569631

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