We examine the role of peer (e.g., Lipper indices) vs. pure (i.e., market indices) benchmarks in the compensation contract of mutual fund managers. We first model the impact of peer vs. pure benchmarks on fund manager incentives. Then, using a unique hand-collected dataset, we test the...

We examine the determinants and consequences of changes in hedge fund fee structures.We show that fee changes are asymmetric with much greater incidence of fee increasescompared to fee decreases. We find that managers of younger and smaller funds are morelikely to increase fees after good...

This paper introduces two measures to investigate potential window-dressing behavior amongmutual fund managers. We show that unskilled managers that perform poorly are more likely towindow dress by strategically purchasing winner stocks and selling loser stocks near quarterends. Further, funds...

This paper introduces two measures to investigate potential window-dressing behavior among mutual fund managers. We show that unskilled managers that perform poorly are more likely to window dress by strategically purchasing winner stocks and selling loser stocks near quarter ends. Further,...

For funds with greater incentives and greater opportunities to inflate returns, we find that (i) returns during December are significantly higher than those during the rest of the year even after controlling for risk in both time-series and the cross-section; (ii) this December spike is greater...

Hedge fund flows chase alpha, yet they also follow returns attributable to traditional and exotic risk exposures. Investors appear more cognizant of exotic risks over time, with flows increasing their relative emphasis on returns from exotic betas in recent years. Investors also discriminate...

This paper develops two measures of performance inconsistency based on information derived from funds' actual performance and their disclosed portfolio holdings. Using these measures, we show that funds with unskilled managers and poor performance are associated with greater inconsistency....

We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...

We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and its disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...