This paper utilizes a rich literature on institutional investors' governance roles and develops simple measures of institutional discontent expressed through holding, trading and voice channels to predict hedge fund activism target selection. Discontent expressed through all three channels leads...

Notwithstanding the focus on hedge fund activism, fundamental questions remain. How much does hedge fund activism really matter? What has academic study contributed to the understanding of hedge fund activism? And what, if anything, does research on hedge fund activism illuminate about the...

Hedge fund activism generates persistent performance, but heterogeneity in performance suggests that some hedge fund activists are more skilled than others. We use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo Bayesian estimation algorithm to isolate a time-invariant activist-specific skill component from...

The forthright brand of shareholder activism hedge funds deploy became during the 2000s a significant feature of Canadian corporate governance. This paper examines hedge fund activism “Canadian style.” The paper characterizes the interventions hedge funds specialize in as “offensive”...

Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits...

I examine how institutional investment horizon affects hedge fund activism. I find that hedge fund activism is higher in firms that long-term institutional investors invest. Furthermore, hedge fund campaigns and success rates differ with investment horizon of institutions. Firms with investors...

This study shows that trade creditors extend a negative response to hedge fund activism. Relative to control firms, target firms' accounts payable decreases by 28%, post activist intervention by hedge funds. This reduction is due to supply-side factors, highlighting suppliers' expropriation...

I document an abnormal increase in the price of default insurance for target firms at the time of an activist hedge fund intervention, despite an abnormal decrease in expected default losses. After the intervention, credit spreads remain abnormally high for confrontational activist campaigns but...

Firms under the threat of hedge fund activism on average experience significant losses of outstanding bondholder wealth: bond yield and default probability rises while bond prices and ratings deteriorate. Under-threat firms receive inferior terms when initiating new loans. These observations are...

This paper investigates the role of institutional trading in the emergence of hedge fund activism – an important corporate governance mechanism. We demonstrate that institutional sales raise a firm's probability of becoming an activist target. Further, by exploiting the funding circumstances...