Continuously rebalanced long-short trades are similar to highly levered trades in that their PNL profile depends not only on the final distribution of return, but also on the realized co-variance structure of the asset pair. It's easily possible for both orientations of a rebalanced long-short...

The US Treasury effectively ”owns” about 24% of the stocks held by high income US taxable investors. Through the capital gains tax, Uncle Sam has an effective exposure of more than $1 trillion of equities. And this huge-but-silent investor might be about to get a lot bigger if capital gains...

Funding is a cost to trading desks that they see as an input. Current FVA-related literature reflects this by also taking funding costs as an input, usually constant, and always risk-neutral. However, this funding curve is the output from a Treasury point of view. Treasury must consider...

This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic...

Supported by several recent investigations the empirical pricing kernel paradox might be considered as a stylized fact. In Chabi-Yo et al. (2008) simulation studies have been presented which suggest that this paradox might be caused by regime switching of stock prices in financial markets....

Supported by several recent investigations the empirical pricing kernel paradox might be considered as a stylized fact. In Chabi-Yo et al. (2008) simulation studies have been presented which suggest that this paradox might be caused by regime switching of stock prices in financial markets....

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...