A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an 'antagonistic' relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the...

This paper analyzes the real effects of differences in structures on financial markets, especially concerning quasi-equilibrium unemployment. It argues that a vibrant venture capital market is an important prerequisite for financing structural change and thus for keeping unemployment low in the...

Das Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG) schafft für deutsche Zielgesellschaften einen neuen organisierten Markt für die Konzentration von Streubesitz. Der Beitrag analysiert den Regulierungsbedarf aus ökonomischer Sicht, er präsentiert und erläutert die ausgeklügelten...

In the last few years, many of the world's largest financial exchanges have converted from mutual, not-for-profit organizations to publicly-traded, for-profit firms. In most cases, these exchanges have substantial responsibilities with respect to enforcing various regulations that protect...

This paper examines the impact of SOX on the total cost and the component cost of going public. First, we document a statistically significant increase in non-underwriting expenses of 0.8 percentage points after the introduction of SOX, which is mostly due to an increase in accounting and legal...

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to...

This paper outlines the foundations of corporate governance. The discussion includes a review on the modern corporation, transaction costs theory, agency costs theory, legal investor protection, investor protection by corporate governance and its various mechanisms, as well as an overview of the...

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...