Franchisee autonomy fosters system-wide adaptability and outlet-owners’ motivationbut also raises the costs from agency problems present in franchiseefranchisordyads. Advancing upon the understanding of agency issues involved infranchising, we test the argument that chains counterbalance the...

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatibleelicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists haveregularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequencesof their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games....

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologiesto catch …sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’resource game may induceseveral ‘subjective’...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilitiesdepend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’past action choices.To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewardswhich can be...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...