This paper provides evidence that tournaments motivate analysts to behave boldly and that tournament incentives can be perverse. Controlling for forecast accuracy, analysts making bold forecasts are more likely to win the tournaments measured by moving to prestigious brokerages or being named as...

This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally,...

Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision of their earnings forecasts for self-serving...

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the...

Does the quality of performance by experts respond to financial incentives? I provide some new evidence on this question by examining the propensity of racehorse trainers to undertake effort-diverting actions. In a sample of 30426 horse races, I find that lower race stakes are strongly...