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Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion
Che, Yeon-Koo - In: The Rand journal of economics 26 (1995) 3, pp. 378-397
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001190242
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Three essays on economic incentive mechanisms : studies on procurement, regulation and tort
Che, Yeon-Koo - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000876380
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Optimal incentives for teams
Che, Yeon-Koo; Yoo, Seung-weon - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000990090
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Decoupling liability : optimal incentives for care and litigation
Polinsky, Alan Mitchell; Che, Yeon-Koo - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000811719
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Decoupling liability : optimal incentives for care and litigation
Polinsky, Alan Mitchell - In: The Rand journal of economics 22 (1991) 4, pp. 562-570
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001118034
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Optimal incentives for teams : comment
Ishiguro, Shingo - In: The American economic review 92 (2002) 5, pp. 1711
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001731460
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Optimal incentives for teams
Che, Yeon-Koo; Yoo, Seung-weon - In: The American economic review 91 (2001) 3, pp. 525-541
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001595135
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Decoupling Liability : Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 1991
A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475381
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Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Pathak, Parag A.; … - In: The American economic review .... 2 (2020) 4, pp. 425-442
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012596113
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Decoupling Liability : Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Che, Yeon-Koo - 2021
A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224692