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The whole is greater than the sum of its parts : pricing pressure indices for mergers of vertically integrated firms

Trost, Michael - 2018

pressure indices, the GUPPI concept of Salop/Moresi (2009) and the vGUPPI concept of Moresi/Salop (2013). Such a simple … screen mergers between mobile network operators which compete with mobile virtual network operators in the downstream retail … imposed so that the iGUPPI for the upstream market allows for a decomposition into an upstream market version of the GUPPI and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011842004

Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts? : pricing pressure indices for mergers of vertically integrated firms

Trost, Michael - In: Review of industrial organization 58 (2021) 2, pp. 235-262

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012489113

Happily ever after? - vertical and horizontal mergers in the U.S. media industry

Stöhr, Annika; Noskova, Victoriia; Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, … - 2019

This paper provides an economic analysis of recent vertical and horizontal mergers in the U.S. industry for audiovisual … media content, including the AT&T-Time Warner and the Disney-Fox mergers. Using a theory-driven approach, we examine … economic effects of these types of mergers on market competition, focusing on digital media content distribution. In doing so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011207

Chapter 15 Antitrust

Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007

policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495

How does downstream firms' efficiency affect exclusive supply agreements?

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato - 2013

This study constructs a model for examining anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform the input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332502

Predatory exclusive dealing

Klein, Joachim; Zenger, Hans - 2009

While the previous literature on exclusive dealing has been concerned with the question of how exclusive dealing can raise static profits, this paper analyzes the question of how exclusive dealing can be used to predate in a dynamic context. It is shown that exclusive dealing may arise even if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951748

Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato - 2016

This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new up-stream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530227

Horizontal mergers in the presence of vertical relationships

Ghosh, Arghya; Morita, Hodaka; Wang, Chengsi - 2014

We study welfare effects of horizontal mergers under a successive oligopoly model and find that downstream mergers can … conditions for a reduction in input prices and welfare-improving horizontal mergers under a general demand function. Qualitative … nature of our findings remains unchanged for upstream mergers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491438

Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato - 2015

This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459057

Naked exclusion with private offers

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg Eric - 2014

We consider a seller s ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to its downstream buyers. Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) showed that this can be a pro fitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers. Segal and Whinston (2000) showed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483054

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