Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets like in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem and...

In the last several years, economists have learned about an antitrust problem of vast scope. Far from approximating the conditions of perfect competition as long assumed, most labor markets are characterized by monopsony — meaning that employers pay workers less than their productivity because...

Recent empirical studies have revealed that labor market monopsony is far more common than previously thought, and that there is a strong correlation between wage suppression and labor market concentration. Yet few antitrust cases have been brought by workers against employers who exercise...

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges...

In its current form, antitrust law is often said to advance consumer welfare and to disregard economic inequality. But with the right priority-setting and other modest reforms, efforts to increase consumer welfare might simultaneously reduce economic inequality. Because monopoly and monopsony...

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. We investigate the political causes of this decline by looking at who made the crucial decisions and how strong a popular mandate they had to do so. Using a novel framework to understand the determinants of regulatory and...

In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and Now, Richard Epstein argues that rather than urge courts and regulators to apply antitrust law to labor markets, reformers who care about labor market competition should try to constrain unions. In this reply, I argue...

This paper provides a review of recent developments in the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law in labor markets. It surveys cases and regulatory efforts, and address recurring questions regarding, among other things, market definition, the role of the consumer welfare standard, and merger analysis

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges...