The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market...

We study the effect of monetary incentives on effort in a prosocial task: writing letters encouraging voter turnout. Volunteers are randomized to receive no incentive, unconditional upfront payment, payment conditional on completing the task, or to have a choice between the two payment schemes....

This paper describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex private- and public-sector employment. In contrast to Vasilev (2015a, 2015b), the public-sector labor supply decision is a sequential one. This requires two separate insurance market to operate, one...

This paper describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex market-sector employment and informal sector work. In contrast to Vasilev (2016a), the discrete-continuous labor supply decision in this paper is a sequential one, and instead of home production, we...