We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...

The purpose of this study was to measure senior level executive perception of what encompasses successful workplace productivity in 21st century organizations. This qualitative study involved 42 senior level executives from 14 different industries and institutional groupings who represented...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages on optimal job design within firms. In our model, two tasks affect firm value and an imperfect performance measure. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. Yet a sufficiently large wage floor...

High Performance Work Systems are generally considered to have a positive impact on workers' well-being. But is this actually the case? This article will discuss this question from the point of view of "End of Fun", a controversial and widely-discussed book by Judith Mair (2003), claiming that...

This paper analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...

The main function of hierarchies is to coordinate activities within an organisation, but a hierarchical structure also provides work incentives, by offering the prospect of hierarchical mobility. An alternative way for organisations to motivate workers is through job design. In organisations...

Using linked employer-employee data for Finland we examine associations between job design and ten measures of worker wellbeing. In accordance with Karasek's (1979) model we find positive correlations between many aspects of worker wellbeing and job control. However, contrary to the model, job...