A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team...

This paper studies the optimal contracts in a multitask model when a principal-agent relationship is long-term. If some outcomes are unverifiable, then the contracts have to satisfy the self-enforcing condition. I characterize the optimal contract in terms of the discount rate, the cost...

This article, from The Oxford Handbook of Dynamic Capabilities (David J. Teece & Sohvi Leih, eds. 2016), describes the construct of “legal astuteness” and explains why it is a valuable dynamic capability. It also examines the systems approach to law and strategy, which embeds the top...

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

Labor standards enforcement in the low-wage workplace has long suffered from a lack of capacity, expertise and remedies that blunt the impact of public and private enforcers alike. The question of how to address these pathologies in state and local workplace regulation has gained new urgency...

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analyzed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context

This is an open source monograph about the economics of teams and the collection of intelligence in an espionage, counter-intelligence context. Our focus is decision-making, including search processes, under ambiguity or true uncertainty and the way that idiosyncratic human reactions to...

A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team...

In today's business environment, team work is omnipresent. But might teams be more prone toward non-compliance with laws and regulations than single individuals despite imminent neg-ative consequences of uncovering misconduct? The recent prevalence of corporate delinquencies gives rise to this...

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context.