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Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Englmaier, Florian (contributor); Wambach, Achim (contributor) - 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011503
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An experimental study on the information structure in teams
Ludwig, Sandra; Strassmair, Christina - 2009
to contribute to the team output. We vary the type of information the second mover receives prior to his effort choice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909260
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See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity in teams
Steiger, Eva-Maria; Zultan, Roi - 2011
observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate …. In a comparable social dilemma, the information chain leads to high cooperation both when compared to a non …-transparent protocol for early movers, and when compared to a fully-transparent protocol for late movers. we conclude that information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281649
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Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort
Kirstein, Annette - 2008
Drawing on the proposer-responder game examined by Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003), I experimentally test four variations of a principal-agent relationship with fixed pay and real effort. Depending on the treatment, the principal can voluntarily, but at her own expense, (1) only reward...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769841
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Optimal Incentive Contracts for a Worker Who Envies His Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2021
A worker's utility may increase with his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318976
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Optimal Incentive Contracts When Workers Envy Their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper employs a principal-agent model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029345
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Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach
Li, Chen - 2019
This paper develops an empirical approach to explicitly test two multi-agent moral hazard models on executive compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses which model is more robust at rationalizing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904639
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Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach
Li, Chen - 2019
This paper develops an empirical approach to explicitly test two multi-agent moral hazard models on executive compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses which model is more robust at rationalizing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899926
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Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams
Klor, Esteban F.; Kube, Sebastian; Winter, Eyal; … - 2011
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278589
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Treating equals unequally : incentives in teams, workers' motivation and production technology
Goerg, Sebastian (contributor); Kube, Sebastian (contributor) - 2007
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612759