How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But,...

In recent decades, research organizations have brought the “market inside the firm” by allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. How do research teams form absent a central authority? We introduce a model of team formation in which workers first match and then non-cooperatively produce...

How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But,...

In recent decades, research organizations have brought the "market inside the firm" by allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. How do teams form absent a central authority? We introduce a model of team formation in which workers first match and then produce correlated signals about an...