This paper discusses the problem of buyer power in labor markets and proposes a framework for more interventionist enforcement under existing merger law. While a common core of basic economic assumptions supports increased enforcement as a general matter, the choice among several available...

In academic and public debate about the increasing imbalance of power between employers and workers, the role of antitrust policy and enforcement has heretofore gotten little attention. This paper shows that where there was once a sharp border — the border of the firm — where labor law ended...

Recent empirical studies have revealed that labor market monopsony is far more common than previously thought, and that there is a strong correlation between wage suppression and labor market concentration. Yet few antitrust cases have been brought by workers against employers who exercise...

The Global Antitrust Institute (“GAI”) respectfully submits this Comment to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in connection with their Request for Information on Merger Enforcement (“Merger RFI”) This comment addresses the questions...

As of late, there has been a concerted push in the Biden administration, backed by prominent academics, to expand the application of antitrust law against major employers who exercise monopsony power that reduces aggregate demand and thus leaves too many workers on the sidelines. The effort...