This paper integrates labor market power and occupational choice, specifically the choice between paid employment and self-employment, to examine the mutual effects between the two. Neglecting the consideration of occupational choice leads to upwardly biased estimates regarding the influence of...

This paper develops a new rationale for the emergence of pay-for-performance contracts. The labor market is competitive, workers are risk averse and firms risk neutral. The paper shows that in stable environments more productive workers self-select into pay-for-performance jobs because risk is...

In this paper we develop a frictionless labor market model in which a firm invests in specific and general training that is neither complement nor substitute to specific training, while the worker invests only in specific training. We use this simple model to show that, contrary to Becker's...

We present a static general equilibrium model of an economy with agents with heterogeneous wealth and endogenous credit constraints created by partial loan recovery rates. Higher loan recovery rates and better bankruptcy protection increase output and credit penetration, while the former raises...

This article develops a new rationale for the emergence of pay-for-performance contracts where the labor market is competitive, workers are risk averse, and firms are risk neutral and unaware of workers' productivities. The article shows that the prevalence of pay for performance rises and the...