Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of its residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no Nash equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive...

Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of its residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no Nash equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive...

Strong evidence shows that the existing pattern of cross-border pension taxation in OECD countries and beyond is extremely diverse and inconsistent, generating a double fairness dilemma for individuals and countries alike. This paper argues that this dilemma cannot be solved within the current...

Policy towards asylum seekers has been a controversial topic for more than a decade. Rising numbers of asylum applications have been met with ever-tougher policies to deter them. Following a period of policy harmonisation, the EU has reached a crucial stage in the development of a new Common...

This paper analyzes the effect of increasing human-capital mobility -- i.e. student and labor mobility -- on net tax revenues when revenue-maximizing governments compete for human capital by means of income tax rates and amenities offered to students (positive expenditure) or rather tuition fees...

Policy towards asylum seekers has been a controversial topic for more than a decade. Rising numbers of asylum applications have been met with ever-tougher policies to deter them. Following a period of policy harmonisation, the EU has reached a crucial stage in the development of a new Common...

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...

We study the nonlinear taxation of internationally mobile workers in general equilibrium. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in general equilibrium, migration lowers the bottom tax rate but raises the top tax rate, making the optimal tax system more progressive and moving tax rates closer to those...

Immigration today presents two distinct but related problems. The first, and most neglected, relates to the money supply and currency values: due to the global availability of Western Union and Moneygram, remittances to home countries have exploded in the last decade, with estimates running into...

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...