We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive...

This paper examines the relationship between performance and top executive turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor market performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs...

We analyze the presence of activist investors (hedge funds and private equity funds) and their impact on top management turnover in Germany. We contrast two hypotheses. The monitoring hypothesis is based on agency theory. Under this hypothesis, we expect active investors to increase top...

We examine the informed trading in the options market for firms announcing CEO turnover and their suppliers and find that pre-announcement options trading in both announcing firms and the suppliers have predictive power for abnormal returns around forced CEO turnover events. This effect is...

In recent years, an increasing share of researches on Finance have placed attention to the study of corporate governance, highlighting its implications to the global performance of companies. One of the ways to assess the structures and practices of the corporate governance is to verify the...

Theories of corporate boards assume that board members of a firm generate private information about the quality and performance of its CEO in the process of monitoring and advising him, and may use this information to decide whether or not to fire him. In this paper, I make use of data on...

We examine operational and stock performance changes around forced CEO turnovers caused by conflicts between corporate boards and CEOs over the strategic direction of the firm. These CEO turnovers tend to be preceded by significant declines and followed by significant improvements in firm...