This paper proposes that the failed presidencies in Argentina since the reinstallation of democracy in 1983 were caused by institutional flaws of the Argentine presidential system itself. While focusing on the failed presidential term of Fernando de La Rua, I argue that the premature departures...

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...

Presidential power is difficult to control through formal institutional checks. Even where constitutional and statutory limits exist, Presidents often seek to work around them. For example, independently elected Presidents may invoke the separation of powers as a justification for acting...