We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric...

This paper analyzes bidding behavior in a multi period multiple unit auction. While bidders are ex ante symmetric, the first period outcome translates the second period game to a game between asymmetric bidders. The first period outcome determines who will be a strong or a weak bidder in the...

We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric...

This paper presents a competitive search model focusing on the impact of asymmetric information on credit markets. We show that limited entry by lenders results in endogenous credit rationing, which, in turn, plays a key role in managing adverse selection and prevents the credit market from...

Motivated by the financial crisis of 2007-2009 several papers have provided explanations for why liquidity may dry up during market stress. This paper also looks at this issue but focuses on the question as to why the liquidity crunch was not uniform across maturities. As funding pressures were...

In this experimental study we examine the impact of self-fulfilling prophecies on financial ratings. According to theoretical models like Kuhner (2001), rating agencies are more likely to reveal their private information if their rating can not become self-fulfilling from an ex-post point of...

This paper provides an explanation for the empirically proven relationship between overtime and future benefits. We suggest an internal signaling model, in which a worker signals his value to the employer by supplying unpaid overtime. In our empirical analysis, we examine whether overtime has in...

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...

An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no information sharing and arbitrary...

This paper examines the conditions for credit volume or borrower rationing in a competitive credit market in which the project characteristics are private information of the borrowers. There can only be credit volume rationing if the higher-risk credit applicants have a higher return in the...