Showing 1 - 10 of 273
We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350831
This paper analyzes bidding behavior in a multi period multiple unit auction. While bidders are ex ante symmetric, the first period outcome translates the second period game to a game between asymmetric bidders. The first period outcome determines who will be a strong or a weak bidder in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702642
We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345757
This paper analyses conditions for rationalizability of rational expectations equilibria of asset market models with asymmetric information and learning from current prices. In such models, traders are asymmetrically informed about the liquidation value of an asset. However, they take into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823311
We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogenous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders’ continuation values which are endogenous influence the sellers’ choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835330
In most Initial Public Offerings (IPO) in the world, the underwriter selects syndicate members and uses the information of their investors' clientele to set the offering price. The objective of this paper is to develop a model of the "book building" process in which the formation of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835395
We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835475
Transparency has become a catchword and in the economic-political debate is often seen as a universal remedy for all sorts of problems. In this paper, we analyze and discuss the meaning and use of the concept of transparency in economic research. We look for common denominators across different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011157171
We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuoustime. In thecontinuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitativelydifferent from thestatic equilibria, emerge....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255809
This discussion paper resulted in an article in <I>Economic Theory</I> (2002). Vol. 20, issue 3, pages 579-601.<P> We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256254