How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

This paper analyzes bidding behavior in a multi period multiple unit auction. While bidders are ex ante symmetric, the first period outcome translates the second period game to a game between asymmetric bidders. The first period outcome determines who will be a strong or a weak bidder in the...

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

This paper studies the problem of incentivizing an agent in an innovation project when the progress of innovation is known only to the agent. I assume the success of innovation requires an intermediate breakthrough and a final breakthrough, with only the latter being observed by the principal....

A game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market is investigated. The profit flows involve two uncertain factors: (1) the basic level of the demand of the market observed only by the incumbent and (2) the fluctuation of the profit flow described by a...

This paper develops a relatively simple method for computing the Markov Perfect Equilibria of dynamic games with asymmetric information (see Maskin and Tirole (1992, 2001)). We consider a class of dynamic games in which there is finite number of active players in each period, each characterized...

This paper studies the problem of a monopolist privately informed about its product quality, who can sell its product in advance, and faces forward-looking buyers who learn about the quality over time. We show that if the monopolist prefers to sell sooner than later, the unique equilibrium...

Government subsidies for R&D are intended to promote projects with high returns to society but too little private returns to be beneficial for private investors. This may be caused by spillovers or a low appropriability rate. Apart from the direct funding of these projects, government grants may...

By using short-term direct finance firms of the highest credit quality expose themselves to rollover risk in the public debt markets. Firms insure themselves against this risk by securing backup lines of credit from banks that they may use should market liquidity dry up. In a first step, this...