Previous studies have stressed that in ation dynamics exhibit a substantial disper- sion across sectors. Using US producer price data, we present evidence that sectoral in ation persistence is negatively correlated with market concentration, which is diffi- cult to reconcile with the prediction...

Under symmetric information, a job protection law which says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ him tomorrow can only reduce the two parties' total surplus. The law restricts the principal's possibilities to maximize her profit, which equals the total surplus, because...

Under symmetric information, a job protection law which says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ him tomorrow can only reduce the two parties' total surplus. The law restricts the principal's possibilities to maximize her profit, which equals the total surplus, because...

This paper analyzes intertemporal seller pricing and buyer purchasing behavior in a laboratory retail market with differential information. A seller posts one price each period that a buyer either accepts or rejects. Trade occurs over a sequence of "market periods" with a random termination...

The paper analyzes how spillovers in the product market affect the incentives of firms to reveal information about their innovative productivity. Such spillovers create a free-rider effect in the patent race that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. The equilibrium disclosure...

An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the...

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

This paper characterizes optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in terms of estimable statistics in the presence of negative duration dependence for the unemployed, with endogenous callback rates generated by asymmetric information. I show how this characterization generalizes the standard...

Short-time work - a wage subsidy conditional on hour reductions - has become an important tool of labor market policy in many European countries. As the scope of these policies expanded, concerns about side effects due to adverse selection increased. We develop a model of job retention policies...