We develop a model of individual prosecutors (and teams of prosecutors) to address the incentives for the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Our model assumes that each individual prosecutor trades off a desire for career advancement (by winning a case) and a disutility for knowingly...

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric information about the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost...

This paper analyzes a contest in which defenders move first, have private information about the value of the objects they are trying to protect, and determine the observability of their defense efforts. The equilibrium consistent with the intuitive criterion depends on the distribution of...

We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro(2003)'s consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs an entry cost before engaging in a patent...

This paper analyzes judicial self-interest and information asymmetries as two major components of the uncertainty, which can emerge in the process of litigation. Judicial self-interest is analyzed as a potential uncertainty-triggering factor as basic human desires such as opportunism and career...

In the article, we discuss the phenomenon of third-party financing of lawsuits, which has been subject to intense debate from a legal as well as from an economic point of view. Drawing on the examples of Germany, Australia, and the United States, we show in Part I that different legal systems...