We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff. This condition is equivalent...

This paper empirically assesses the relationship between culture and a free press. The results reveal that a privatized or ‘free media' strongly influences informal institutions of a country or what is commonly known as culture. By providing unbiased and a wide variety information to the...

A sender designs a signal about the state of the world to persuade a receiver. Under standard assumptions, an optimal signal censors states on one side of a cutoff and reveals all other states. This result holds in continuous and discrete environments with general and monotone partitional...

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...

We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase...