We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the … ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post incentive compatible … mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn …

merger between regulated firms when cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes private … information of the merged firm. The optimal merger policy trades off potential cost savings against regulatory distortions from … market induces a more lenient merger policy. The regulated firms' diversification into a competitive segment of the market …

exact amount of cost efficiency/inefficiency that will result from the merger. Nevertheless, the key element of the model is … always have incentives to merge, irrespective of cost uncertainty, while a merger without role redistribution is ex ante … merger between leaders always enhances welfare if participants have incentives to merge, such that private and collective …