Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

Obwohl in fiskalföderalen Systemen Konsens über die Vorteilhaftigkeit der dezentralen Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter besteht, zeigen sich große Unterschiede bei der Ausgestaltung von Finanzausgleichssystemen. Diese Unterschiede werden hier aus dem Blickwinkel der Anreizwirkungen...

The volume includes theoretical articles on banks' liability restrictions, on the possible causes of the banking crisis and economic-policy recommendations on banking regulation by Hans-Werner Sinn in the past three decades.