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We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
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The goal of this paper is to study how informational frictions affect asset liquidity in OTC markets in a laboratory setting. The experiments replicate an OTC market similar to the one used in monetary and financial economics (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005):...
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We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077977
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538316