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In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses affecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of...
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In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
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We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
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We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
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novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational … of insider information the call auction performs worse than continuous double auction. Testing these hypotheses in the … lab we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the …
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