We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity …

debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two … auction institutions. In our treatment condition some sellers have less information than in our baseline conditions. In both … conditions transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However …

debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two … auction institutions. In our treatment condition some sellers have less information than in our baseline conditions. In both … conditions transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However …

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have … uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function …. Price-cost margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper …