Similar Search Results

On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Mukherjee, Arijit; Mukherjee, Arijit - In: Games and economic behavior 107 (2018), pp. 345-363

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976547

Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns : the role of information disclosure

Mukherjee, Arijit - In: The Rand journal of economics 39 (2008) 2, pp. 469-490

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003740012

Welfare effects of foreign direct investment : cost saving vs. signaling

Mukherjee, Arijit; Broll, Udo - In: Journal of economics 90 (2007) 1, pp. 29-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003416839

Essays in economics of organization

Mukherjee, Arijit - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909176

Deregulation redux : does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?

Higgins, Richard S.; Mukherjee, Arijit - In: Public choice 142 (2010) 3/4, pp. 363-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955803

Relatinal contracts with subjective peer evaluations

Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503460

Interim performance feedback in multistage tournaments : the optimality of partial disclosure

Goltsman, Maria; Mukherjee, Arijit - In: Journal of labor economics 29 (2011) 2, pp. 229-265

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273275

Technology transfer under asymmetric information : the role of epuity participation

Marjit, Sugata; Mukherjee, Arijit - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 157 (2001) 2, pp. 282-300

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001599325

Relational contracts with subjective peer evaluations

Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit - In: The Rand journal of economics 47 (2016) 1, pp. 3-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665255

Information disclosure through technology licensing

Mukherjee, Arijit; Bagchi, Aniruddha - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/37, pp. 1-8

We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432202